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Abstract 
The Internet of Things (IoT) holds great potential for 
productivity, quality control, supply chain efficiencies and 
overall business operations. However, with this broader 
connectivity, new vulnerabilities and attack vectors are 
being introduced, increasing opportunities for systems to 
be compromised by hackers and targeted attacks. These 
vulnerabilities pose severe threats to a myriad of IoT 
applications within areas such as manufacturing, 
healthcare, power and energy grids, transportation and 
commercial building management. While embedded 
OEMs offer technologies, such as hardware Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM), that deploy strong chain-of-trust 
and authentication mechanisms, still they struggle to 
protect against vulnerabilities introduced by vendors and 
end users, as well as additional threats posed by potential 
technical vulnerabilities and zero-day attacks. This paper 
proposes a pro-active policy-based approach, enforcing 
the principle of least privilege, through hardware Security 
Policy Engine (SPE) that actively monitors 
communication of applications and system resources on 
the system communication bus (ARM AMBA-AXI4). 
Upon detecting a policy violation, for example, a malicious 
application accessing protected storage, it counteracts 
with predefined mitigations to limit the attack. The 
proposed SPE approach widely complements existing 
embedded hardware and software security technologies, 
targeting the mitigation of risks imposed by unknown 
vulnerabilities of embedded applications and protocols. 
1 Introduction 
The IoT market has grown significantly, with a massive range 
of IoT products reaching further into different areas, 
including home user’s private lives, the enterprise, as well as 
deployment to control critical manufacturing and industrial 
appliances [1]. Indeed, estimates from Gartner predict that 
IoT will proliferate to 20.5 Billion Devices by 2020 [2]. 
Simultaneously, so too has the opportunity for malicious 
actors to take advantage of IoT devices, exposing them to a 
myriad of security risks [3]. These security risks may include 
compromising the user’s privacy, damaging industrial 
applications, steal information from an enterprise, or using the 
IoT’s own computing resources to launch attacks elsewhere, 
as seen in the Mirai botnet [4]. 
The required level of security for IoT cannot be defined 
generically due to highly versatile application markets such as 
mobile, consumer electronics, medical and industrial control 
solutions. IoT security is a challenging research problem, with 
trust issues at every level, from authentication of the user, 
communication between interconnected devices, handling of 
sensitive data and the potential for malware and physical 
attacks to compromise any aspect of the ecosystem [5]. 
With such a wide range of potential attacks, efforts must be 
made at all levels of design to incorporate security, to ensure 
trustworthiness of devices, and to prevent compromise of user 
data and device. It includes design philosophy, software and 
hardware architectures, choice of components used and even 
where manufacturing takes place [6]. In addition, relevant 
secure practices must be extended to and enforced at every 
layer within the IoT ecosystem, which typically comprises of 
the following components: 
 
• Cloud: Providing data storage and overarching 
computing services. 
• Gateway: Interfacing the edge to the cloud component. 
• Edge: The end-point device containing sensors and 
actuators. 
 
As IoT devices have increased in computing capability and 
extensively used to handle sensitive tasks and information, 
the industry has responded by providing secure 
methodologies and technologies to enhance trustworthiness 
and ensure correct function of the devices [7], [8]. These 
technologies involve both hardware and software, along with 
practices for design and development. This paper will survey 
some of these technologies, looking at existing solutions that 
provide root-of -trust and protect critical data such as private 
keys and embedded Intellectual Property (IP). Also, 
technologies that protect the operating device from malicious 
use will be surveyed, including architectural based methods 
of segregating critical and non-critical applications, regarding 
device storage, execution and memory. Software solutions 
will also be considered, particularly those that enhance 
segregation of potentially malicious applications from critical 
system components. However, while these technologies have 
relevance and offer protections to IoT devices, vulnerabilities 
continued to be found and exploited within IoT devices, with 
the security technology itself often being the weakness 
allowing access. Also, new vulnerabilities continue to be 
found, such as application and protocol implementation issues 
that inadvertently allow malicious use without any security 
technologies being aware. 
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To counter these issues and to complement existing security 
technologies, this paper introduces the concept of a Security 
Policy Engine (SPE), a hardware-based solution that monitors 
activities on the System-on-chip (SoC) communications bus. 
The proposed system utilises access control type policies to 
prevent unauthorised access to components by applications. 
The SPE is physically segregated from the operating system 
(OS) but can monitor activities such as sensor and actuator 
controls, application-specific access to peripherals, 
communication channels and other system resources using the 
system communication bus. The security policies are pre-
defined policy comprising of two parts, (1) A whitelist of 
permitted access control and transaction rules used for system 
monitoring, and (2) A list of countermeasures, executed when 
a rule violation occurs. The SPE can co-operate with on-chip 
security components to initiate programmed attack responses 
to protect security critical assets. The proposed SPE is a 
hardware-based SoC security component designed for 
resource-constrained IoT devices. 
 
2 Background 
2.1 Secure IoT device life cycle 
A concept of design for security has introduced to cater for 
the increasing complexity of IoT ecosystems and to attain a 
secure development life cycle [9], [10], [11]. A secure IoT 
device life cycle requires incorporation of security measures 
within every component, from securing the device, the data 
within the device and the communication channel between 
edge and the cloud service [12], [13], for the entire lifespan of 
the device, from deployment to decommission, as shown in 
Figure 1. The design and development stage should mitigate 
for security issues not yet known, allowing for capacity to add 
additional functionality after deployment or to conform with 
additional regulations after deployment. To achieve the 
desired device flexibility, the embedded designers have 
introduced hardware and software co-design approaches 
within the IoT ecosystem. The involvement of multiple 
designers and developers working at different hardware and 
software stacks increase the complexity of the ecosystem. 
One company may design a device, another supplies 
component software, another operates the network in which 
the device is embedded, and another deploys the device. A 
lack of clear security decisions and responsibilities opens IoT 
devices to a range of risks, vulnerabilities and attacks [14], 
[15]. The security challenge has further magnified by a lack 
of comprehensive, widely adopted standards for IoT security. 
Life Cycle Stage Hardware Security Requirements Security Measures 
Manufacturing •
 Secure programming. 
• Circumvent device impersonation and 
overbuilding 
• Unique device hardware identity 
• Bit-stream encryption 
• Certificate of conformance  
Deployment •
 Secure provisioning and management. 
• Secure configuration and control. 
• Secure monitoring and diagnosis 
• Secure boot 
• Secure storage of secret data 
Field Upgrade •
 Secure firmware update to enforce and 
maintain chain-of-trust. 
• Firmware integrity to circumvent malicious 
software updates. 
• Data integrity check mechanism 
• Authentication and authorisation 
mechanisms 
• Anti-tamper protection 
Decommission •
 Secure device disposal to ensure 
confidentiality of secret data.  
• Invalidate device and cannot be reinserted into 
the supply chain again. 
• Secret data zeroization. 
• Revocation of certificate of conformance 
• Certificate revocation list (CRL) 
Table 1: Classification of security requirements based on device life cycle. 
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Figure 1: Secure embedded development life cycle of IoT devices. 
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The issue has been deemed serious enough that proposals to 
regulate IoT have been made at US Congress [16] and EU 
government levels [17].  Table 1 outlines the security 
requirements and measures to attain, deploy and ensure 
secure embedded development life cycle. These security 
requirements set the embedded design architectural choices to 
harness and enforce robust IoT security practices. 
2.2 Root-of-trust (RoT) in IoT devices 
To support, the security requirements listed in Table 1, 
confidentiality and authentication must adhere to the 
root/trust anchor. The trust anchor can be implemented using 
hardware and software approaches. Within the target device, 
the root-of-trust (RoT) implements the trust anchor [11], 
[18], [19]. The security device uses a Proof-of-Knowledge 
approach based on challenge-response protocol. The host 
authority initiates the verification process by: 
 
• Generating a random challenge for the device. 
• The device performs a cryptographic function using 
secret data and returns the output response. 
• If the target device’s output satisfies the challenge, the 
verifying authority treats the target as authentic. 
 
When the concept of RoT first emerged, a software approach 
was used, with secret data stored in non-volatile memory as 
shown in Figure 2. The verifying authority read the secret 
data to confirm the authenticity of the device. However, this 
software RoT has exposed to device impersonation attacks.  
The trust anchor/root must be baked within the device as a 
unique ID to circumvent this problem. Because, it is relatively 
difficult for an attacker to modify the functionality of the 
hardware to the extent where the hardware is immutable [6], 
[11], [20]. Therefore, hardware root-of-trust (HRoT) has 
introduced, as shown in Figure 2. It allows the device to 
generate a unique and unalterable identity by using a 
Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). PUF provides a 
unique challenge-response mechanism dependent on the 
complex and variable nature of the silicon material used to 
manufacture the device. By baking the trust anchor within the 
device, it provides isolated hardware-based verification of the 
target device and enables robust post-manufacturing device 
provisioning options to OEM and customers by generating 
PUF dependent obfuscated private keys (even unknown to 
chip manufacturers). The HRoT serves as device primary 
root-of-trust on which the remaining trust chain is built, 
maintained from system boot-up to power-down, improving 
firmware verification and integrity checks. 
2.3 Trusted computing technologies and embedded 
security 
The goal of Trusted computing is to develop technologies, 
which give users guarantees about the behaviour of the 
software running on their devices. A device can be trusted if it 
always behaves in an expected manner for the intended 
purpose even when the attacker gains control of the device 
[21]. It is a complex goal, covering security aspects that result 
in a wide range of hardware and software co-design solutions. 
Many IoT designs make use of software portability, porting 
operating systems, network communication stacks, software 
libraries and service that were not designed primarily for 
secure or machine-to-machine (M2M) devices to reduce time-
to-market and gain a competitive advantage. As a result, these 
devices might sub-optimally designed for their use case, 
which may impose a security risk. A similar trend is observed 
where third-party IP (usually encrypted netlist) is integrated 
to build secure hardware architectures and platforms which 
has opened doors to hardware trojan and malware. To 
address this issue while retaining benefits of software 
computing, hardware architects adopted the concept of 
software virtualisation and propagated it into hardware 
architectures. As a result, many embedded platforms can run 
operating systems (OS), such as Linux that significantly 
improving functionality and enabling for matured software-
based security applications to further enhance device security. 
Support of privileged and non-privileged modes by OS 
provided a method to achieve isolation and segregation of 
system resources. 
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is an example of an 
architecture extension that allows user level applications to 
make use of protected regions of memory, known as enclaves, 
to perform execution in isolation, with privacy from higher 
privileged applications, the OS, hypervisor, as well as drivers 
and device firmware. This therefore, allows running of trusted 
code within untrusted environments such as the cloud or 
device deployments. AEGIS, ARM TrustZone, TrustLite and 
Sanctum are other examples of architectures that support 
hardware isolation and allow execution of secure code within 
confined environment [22], [23], [24].  
The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), written by 
GlobalPlatform [25], is the secure area of the main processor 
that provides isolated execution of trusted application 
resources. The TEE is isolated from the Rich Execution 
Environment (REE) where the untrusted OS runs. The REE 
resources are accessible from TEE but not vice versa unless 
explicitly allowed by TEE. Some embedded solution 
providers have developed their own TEE solutions such as 
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Figure 2: Software and Hardware Root-of-Trust 
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Trustonics and Qualcomm QSEE.  A TPM harnesses and 
maintains embedded chain-of-trust by authenticating devices 
and systems with the help of dedicated cryptographic 
hardware units. The TPM security functions are enforced and 
managed by the TEE, which runs on a virtualised hardware 
and shares the same system resources as the application. The 
ARM TrustZone is an example of such hardware-based 
system security architecture that virtually segregates the 
system resources into secure and non-secure worlds. 
From the silicon and IP manufacturer’s business point-of-
view, embedded device security could be a feature that can be 
enabled and disabled on-demand or offered with optional 
levels of protection depending on the desired application use-
case. To meet versatile IoT application requirements, it can be 
flexible on-demand hierarchical segregation of system 
resources into multiple secure islands that can only exchange 
data within their designated secure island. 
2.4 Trusted computing-based solutions 
Samsung Knox is a security suite developed for mobile 
devices that employs trusted computing. Knox features a 
layered array of features, presented to the user as a secure 
environment for segregating work and personal activities. 
Bootloader protection verifies the integrity of the secure 
world OS and the kernel. Security Enhancements for Android 
to prevent unauthorised application access, based on 
confidentiality requirements. TrustZone-based Integrity 
Measurement Architecture (TIMA) monitors the kernel to 
detect compromise and corruption from within the TrustZone. 
The attestation feature to remotely validate the device’s 
authenticity before access. Knox makes use of ARM 
TrustZone, providing a TEE platform for securing the 
contained work environment and associated applications, 
increasing security within Bring your own device (BYOD) 
deployments [26]. 
2.5 Software-based IoT security solutions 
The Android Application Sandbox is a method used by the 
Android OS to segregate applications from one another, thus 
preventing one application from being able to access data 
from another application, except under controlled 
circumstances. Android makes use of Security-Enhanced 
Linux (SELinux) to enhance the Application sandbox and 
ensure application permissions, as configured by the user, are 
adhered to [27].  
SELinux is an access control layer, implemented within the 
Kernel, enforcing policies to ensure minimal privileges are 
granted to applications, to limit their function only to how 
they are specified. Within a SELinux environment, an 
exploited vulnerability will be unable to gain access beyond 
the SELinux boundaries, as defined by the administrator, 
enforcing the principle of least privilege [28]. Designed by 
the NSA and RedHat, SELinux has widely used within 
commercial Linux deployments.  
Software containerisation implements a form of application 
isolation, under the same kernel instance. Containers allow 
for segregation of applications while allowing access to OS 
components that have been assigned access, with kernel 
measures to limit resource consumption. Due to the usage of 
the system’s native kernel, containerisation does not apply 
overheads that virtualisation consists of. Containers have 
been adopted for use in mobile applications by several 
vendors including Samsung (Knox), IBM (MaaS360), 
Blackberry (Secure Work Space) and Google (Android for 
Work) [29], [26], [30].  
3 Vulnerabilities and threats posed to IoT 
3.1 IoT relevant security issues and root causes 
IoT devices may be attacked and compromised by a wide 
range of methods, including the same as those used against 
cloud and regular IT systems along with new attack vectors 
created by the IoT. These attacks may target a wide range of 
aspects, from the protocol stack to the systems’ applications, 
bootloader and hardware peripherals, including even the 
security technologies designed to protect them. The following 
examples specify some common design vulnerabilities 
affecting IoT, along with their root causes that enable them to 
be use against IoT devices. This section will survey 
embedded and IoT device hardware and software security 
vulnerabilities and attacks reported in open literature. 
 
Software configuration: Perhaps the best attack to affect IoT 
devices is the Mirai Botnet, which affected network 
connected webcams and DVRs, amongst other devices. 
Taking advantage of poor device configuration practices by 
the IoT OEM, this attack scanned the internet, compromising 
the IoT devices using a standard password and open telnet 
port, peaked at 600,000 infections. Upon installing a basic 
malware application, it made use of IoT’s network 
connectivity to launch Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS) 
attacks against online hosting services, including OVH and 
DynDNS, peaking at a record 1.2Tb/s [4].  
 
Software development: Use of vulnerable libraries and 
components: The OpenSSL Heartbleed CEV-2014-0160 is a 
prime example. This vulnerability consisted of a missing 
boundary check within a memcpy function, allowing an 
attacker to view arbitrary data from the OS memory. 
Vulnerabilities of this nature are of serious risk to IoT as their 
smaller memory size eases the difficulty in locating sensitive 
data [31]. 
 
Key management practices: Another attack leveraged key 
management vulnerabilities in the ZigBee IoT wireless 
protocol and side-channel analysis of device to extract a 
common firmware-signing key, to spread malware using 
ZigBee as the communication medium. The firmware image-
signing key could be extracted from the device using 
correlation power analysis, allowing modified malicious 
firmware to be installed. This compromised device could 
propagate to nearby devices, taking advantage of a leaked 
universal key for the ZigBee protocol, compromising them 
with the same malicious firmware update [32]. 
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User interface: When interface methods are used to protect 
the device and user, they may become an attack surface. 
Vulnerabilities have been found to exist in mobile and 
touchscreen devices, (CVE-2015-3860) allowing bypass of 
the lock screen, as well as theft based “Factory Reset 
Protection” on Android devices. These methods involve 
taking advantage of sophisticated navigation structures and 
unprotected text entries, allowing a malicious user to escape 
locked environment [33]. 
 
Kernel and driver: These issues are a source of major 
vulnerabilities in embedded devices, due to the low-level 
access these components require. Vulnerabilities such as 
(CVE-2016–5195) Dirty COW (Copy on write), exploit a 
race condition found in kernel memory subsystem and 
handling of read-only memory mappings. An unprivileged 
user could exploit this with a simple program to gain write 
access to read-only memory [34]. 
 
Hardware-based: ARM TrustZone was shown to lack proper 
rollback protection in the secure boot. Using an old key, an 
attacker could load a malicious application into the TEE to 
run in the secure world, providing access to the device’s 
secret data [20]. Mitigation of this attack type is to formulate 
a well-defined rollback and update policy. Qualcomm's QSEE 
and Samsung Exynos devices have been found vulnerable to 
similar downgrade and rollback attacks [35]. Chen et al. 
further compromised ARM TrustZone cache. Using side 
channel analysis, the attackers were successfully able to 
monitor cache activity of Android’s cryptographic operations 
[36]. Mitigation of cache-based attacks consists of deploying 
different caches or to clear the cache when switching from 
secure to non-secure world.  Frédéric has launched attack 
against an Amlogic S905 processor that uses ARM TrustZone 
for DRM & other security features. He successfully managed 
to bypass secure boot and break the chain-of-trust deploying 
series of attacks [37]. 
 
Insider and user error: Finally, it should not be understated 
that the user can inadvertently or deliberately cause system 
vulnerabilities [38]. 
3.2 Shortcomings of existing solutions 
After reviewing different aspects of security problems in IoT 
devices, their security methodologies and architectures to 
protect secret assets. It is clear that these existing approaches 
fall short of their desired security goals. This due to: 
 
• A complex IoT eco-system where different vendors are 
developing hardware, software and security components, 
leading to interoperability issues and vulnerabilities in 
hardware, software and protocol stack boundaries. 
• Development of inconsistent and vulnerable software 
applications, libraries and protocols, caused by lack of 
security aware design and development practises. 
• A lack of IoT security standards which vendors can 
incorporate to improve their product development life 
cycle to reduce root cause of vulnerabilities. 
Though reliance on robust and secure software development 
practices focusing on application, kernel and device-driver 
layers alone is not sufficient. Since vulnerabilities may be 
found and exploited in other areas outside of the developer’s 
control, such as a CPU vulnerability, a flaw within a common 
standard, or other unforeseen failures. Additionally, existing 
trusted computing technologies may later be compromised, if 
the components it relies upon are found to be vulnerable, as 
has been shown with Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone 
technology. Finally, it is important to mention that even when 
the devices are operating correctly, they may be compromised 
due to human operational errors, be that a user 
misconfiguration, error, exposure of authentication through a 
social engineering attack, or insider threat. 
4 Embedded policing and policy enforcement 
approach 
To approach the identified shortcomings in this paper, we 
propose a policing and policy enforcement approach, to 
enhance system security and scalability by complementing 
existing security technologies and embedded architectures. 
Based on hardware, but complementing software concepts 
such as SELinux, this policing approach follows the principle 
of least privilege, monitoring system communication and 
behaviour of the system resources and comparing it to 
authorised behaviours for that resource. In case of unexpected 
behaviour, for example, a malicious action from a 
compromised application or launching of attack by the 
adversary, the system can take active and passive counter-
measures to mitigate the attack and protect the system assets. 
Like SELinux, the proposed policy approach aims to limit an 
attack’s capability, assuming other system protections have 
failed. Expected behaviours shall be defined as the system 
security policy, which can be updated at any stage of the 
device life cycle. The policing approach, deployed at the 
system communication layer, will be transparent to existing 
embedded system architectures that use the de-facto industry 
standard ARM AMBA-AXI4 SoC bus communication 
protocol, along with their software stacks (bare-metal, 
embedded Linux, Real-time operating system (RTOS), 
Hypervisor, device drivers etc.). The proposed policing and 
policy enforcement system architecture will not only enhance 
the security of the device but will also improve its flexibility 
to meet changing security requirements of next-generation 
embedded and IoT architectures, as well as the next-
generation of threats. 
4.1 Embedded policy platform architecture 
Embedded systems are complex, with system designers and 
software developers often required to consolidate different 
functionalities into a single application by combining 
sensitive and non-sensitive data. Heterogeneous 
multiprocessor system-on-chip (MPSoC) platforms composed 
of multiple processors, hardware IPs, on-chip support of 
major peripheral interfaces and shared memory resources, are 
a suitable choice to achieve design goals, as this aids 
adaptability, reusability, and upgradability and reduces time-
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to-market. They offer on-chip hardware security features to 
protect the critical assets and attain security that is essential 
requirements of next-generation secure systems. To realise 
the proposed policing and policy enforcement approach, we 
present a system architecture that uses Xilinx Zynq 
UltraScale+ MPSoC as shown in Figure 3. This platform has 
chosen due to the on-chip availability of hardware security 
and cryptographic features, essential for building HRoT. 
The MPSoC features an on-chip Quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 
Application Processing Unit (APU) for general purpose 
computing and a Dual-core ARM Cortex-R5 Real-time 
Processing Unit (RPU) for critical applications requiring 
deterministic low-latency. The APU supports multiple 
software stack configurations based on application design 
requirements. It can be configured to execute applications as 
bare metal, Linux, hypervisor software stacks [39]. It has an 
ARM TrustZone hardware module that extends the secure and 
non-secure world applications to ARM AMBA-AXI4 bus 
transaction using non-secure (NS) bit of AxPROT and limits 
access to the system resources. In proposed system 
architecture, it has assumed that user software will execute on 
APUs and treat it as untrusted application host processor that 
utilises system data and memory resources. On the other 
hand, the application to configure and manage the critical 
components of our proposed system architecture will run on 
RPU and be treated as trusted application. RPU has a dual 
64KB tightly-coupled memory (TCM) that is physically 
isolated from APU, L1 and L2 cache memory. This system 
security boundary has highlighted in Figure 3. This physical 
isolation and segregation ensure that untrusted applications 
cannot read, write or modify any part of TCM, overcoming 
one of the shortfalls of virtualised security architectures. 
Central to our policing and policy enforcement approach are 
following hardware engines: 
 
1. Security policy engine      (SPE) 
2. Security response engine  (SRE) 
3. Anti-tamper engine           (ATE) 
 
The proposed SPE has implemented using FPGA glue logic 
to monitor system-level communication among system 
peripherals and memory blocks, comparing against the 
defined policies for each resource, and initiates pro-active 
response actions to counteract attacks. Therefore, it can be 
ported to other FPGA and ASIC architectures as IP and is not 
limited to the proposed platform. To maximise flexibility to 
changes in security policies, each hardware engine has AXI4-
Lite communication, that can be used by the RPU to 
configure and program engine specific security parameters. 
This can fulfil the proposed architecture to meet the dynamic 
security requirements of different devices. 
 The ARM AMBA-AXI4 protocol specification specifies that 
the bus establishes the communication between a master and 
a slave using five separate channels; address write, write 
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Figure 3: Block diagram of system architecture to implement the proposed policing and policy enforcement approach. It 
allows to harness and enforce defined security policies within FPGA MPSoC platform. 
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Figure 4: ARM AMBA-AXI4 compliant master-slave 
communication interface signals 
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data, write response, address read and read data as 
illustrated in Figure 4. Each channel has VALID and READY 
handshake signals. VALID indicates that data available on the 
bus is valid, and READY indicates that the receiver is ready 
to receive the data. To exchange data, both VALID and 
READY signals should be active. Both address channels have 
3-bit AxPROT signals, where the non-secure (NS) bit 
indicates the security attribute of the transaction. 
4.2 Security policy Engine (SPE)  
The idea of the SPE is comparable to a policy-based hardware 
firewall, which checks the approved list of devices, and either 
grants or restrict access to the device. The SPE engine 
enforces system resource specific requirements by actively 
monitoring shared communications at the interface between 
AMBA-AXI4 bus and target system resource (memory, 
sensor, actuator etc.) The SPE is capable of independently 
monitoring and enforcing policies related to that resource. 
The SPE itself is composed of an AXI4 sniffer block, Device 
table, Policy table, Decision block and Engine configuration 
block as shown in Figure 5. 
4.2.1 SPE Hardware Components 
AXI4-Sniffer: This component monitor and maintain the 
necessary AXI4 handshake signals as defined in ARM 
AMBA-AXI4 communication protocol specification, until the 
decision block checks and grants access to the target system 
resource as shown in Figure 5. This component is essential to 
maintain correct system level communication.  
The AXI4-sniffer receives AXI-transaction from the shared 
system communication bus and samples requesting resource 
and target resource addresses. It samples AWVALID and 
ARVALID control signals to identify whether the requesting 
resource has asked for reading or writing operation on the 
target resource. It samples the target address, AWADDR or 
ARADDR, and forwards it to the policy table. The resource 
address is passed to the device table to locate the base-address 
of the policies stored in the policy table as shown in Figure 5. 
During this process, to maintain physical isolation between 
requesting resource and the target resource, the AXI4-sniffer 
physically blocks the handshake signals by de-asserting 
WVALID and RVALID control signals. Once the decision 
block validates and allows access, based on the defined 
policy, the AXI4-sniffer asserts the WVALID or RVALID 
signals respectively. 
 
Device table: This contains the list of trusted requesting 
resources that are permitted to access the target resource. In 
this table, each trusted requesting resource has a 
corresponding base-address of the security policies that 
specify the access rights linked to it, as shown in Figure 5.  
The length of the device table is limited to the number of 
requesting resources. It can be realised by distributed RAM 
that uses LUT resources of FPGA logic to extract policy table 
address. The device table allows not only to filter trusted and 
un-trusted requesting resources but can be used to detect 
intrusions. If an intrusion is detected, it can be suppressed by 
initiating a pro-active mitigation response by SRE to secure 
the system’s assets. 
  
Policy table: This contains the permission rights of the target 
resource that corresponds to each trusted requesting resource. 
The stored policies can be simple as address read/write 
permissions or complex policies to check variable length 
(AxSIZE and AxLEN) transfers, security profile assigned by 
the software (AxPROT), or quality of service (AxQOS). It 
can be realised by block RAM (BRAM) in FPGA logic. From 
a software point-of-view, the policy table not only provides 
means to secure assets, it also provides a mechanism that can 
be used for secure provisioning of the device at any stage of 
the device life cycle, by defining role-based access policies. 
Decision block: This receives the programmed/reference 
policy issued by the policy table, compares the status of AXI4 
signals, as per security policy and generates a result. The 
generated result will be passed to AXI-Sniffer, which then 
either grant or block the requested AXI4 transaction as shown 
in Figure 5.  
 
Engine configuration block: This provides functionality to 
program and configure the security parameters of the SPE, 
using a secure application running on the RPU via the AXI4-
Lite communication interfaces, as shown in Figure 5. It 
allows programming and updating of both the device table 
and the policy table. 
4.3 Security Response Engine (SRE) 
This engine provides effective active responses to security 
threats reported by the decision block, to initiate mitigation 
response. It does this by interrupting the secure code running 
on the RPU and requests the time-critical interrupt service. 
The pro-active response shall be initiated by executing the 
interrupt service routine (ISR) of the SRE and is enforced by 
the ATE. Following are examples of pro-active responses that 
can be enforced: 
 
 
Security Policy Engine (SPE)
Policy 
Table
Device 
Table
Device#1
Device#2
Device#3
Device#N
CONTROL
STATUS
MODE
AXI4 Sniffer
DeviceAddr
Decision
Block
Resource_Addr
AXI4-Lite Configuration Interface
Engine Configuration Block
response
 
 
Figure 5: Block diagram of Security Policy Engine (SPE) 
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• Erasure of secret keys stored in the device to ensure 
confidentiality. 
• Permanent disabling of the system cryptographic 
functions, if the system has compromised. 
• Disabling system read-back interfaces. 
• Initiation of secure lockdown of the system resources. 
• Initiation of system reset. 
4.4 Anti-tamper engine (ATE) 
This engine enforces the pro-active measures initiated by the 
SRE. Also, it provides passive physical security measures 
against hardware level attacks, such as side- channel analysis, 
by monitoring the devices physical parameters such as 
voltage and temperature. An alarm can be initiated if the 
system violates the set conditions. Following are the anti-
tamper features that can be ensured: 
 
• Maintain uninterruptable internal clock sources. 
• Monitoring on single-event-upset to ensure fault tolerant 
execution during operational device life cycle. 
• Voltage and temperature monitoring to ensure device 
operation and resist against active hardware attacks. 
4.5 Area and timing results 
The proposed security policy engine (SPE) and its hardware 
components presented in Section 4.2 are coded in Verilog 
HDL. The design was simulated and synthesised using Xilinx 
Vivado v2017.1 on the high-end chips of the Zynq-7000 and 
Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC family. The area and timing results 
are reported in Table 2. The device table implemented using 
Distributed RAM utilises 32 LUTRAM, while the policy 
table used a BRAM. The design is compact and consumes 
less than 1% of FPGA glue logic available on Zynq chips. 
The reported timing results shows that SPE can operate at 
maximum 250 MHz and 333 MHz on Kintex-7 and Kintex 
UltraScale+ chips. The reported timing is limited by the 
maximum possible speed of ARM AMBA-AXI4 bus on these 
chips [40], [41]. 
5 Preliminary Use-case 
A heterogeneous system composed of BRAM based memory 
devices has realised as shown in Figure 6. It has considered 
that specific location of each device holds secret assets that 
shall be protected to ensure confidentiality. Each device is 
connected to the host through the ARM AMBA-AXI4 
communication bus via an AXI4-interconnect. To integrate 
the proposed approach, the SPE has integrated between the 
device and the shared AXI4 bus.  It polices the addressed 
transactions, checks the read and write access policy attached 
to the requesting resource (BRAM memory location) and 
either grants or refuses access to the asset as shown in Figure 
6. In this use case, a bare-metal software application approach 
has been adopted to avoid software development complexity.  
At power-up, the host application configures the platform by 
programming the device and policy table of each SPE through 
the AXI4-Lite interface as shown in Figure 6. The policy 
table stores the register read and write access permissions for 
each device. 
The presented system is synthesized and implemented on the 
widely available Avnet Zedboard (Zynq-7000) and Xilinx 
ZCU102 (Zynq UltraScale+) evaluation boards using Xilinx 
Vivado v2017.1. Table 3 reports the preliminary 
implementation results. The BRAM utilisation of both 
implementations is consistent. Each SPE has used single 
BRAM each to implement policy table, while each memory 
device consumed two BRAMs. Due to technology scaling and 
MPSoC FPGA fabric  
(technology) 
Speed 
Grade 
Area Frequency 
(MHz) LUT LUTRAM FF BRAM 
Zynq-7000 Kintex-7 (28nm) -3 87 32 304 1 250 
Zynq UltraScale+ EG Kintex UltraScale+ (16nm) -3 55 32 235 1 333 
Table 2: Synthesis results of proposed security policy engine (SPE) on Zynq-7000 and Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC 
Table 2: Comparison of secure features supported by leading FPGA MPSoC 
 
AXI4-Lite
Device#N
SPE
AXI4-Interconnect
Device#1
SPE
ARM Cortex-A
Policy Table
Device 
Table
Device 1
0x000
0xFFF
0x004
0
1
1
1
0
1
R WAddress
Device N
 
 
Figure 6: Read/write policy enforcement on simple 
memory devices within MPSoC. 
Development  
Board 
FPGA fabric  
(technology) 
Speed Grade Area Utilisation Frequency 
(MHz) LUT LUTRAM FF BRAM 
Zedboard  Artix-7 (28nm) -1 1043 91 1436 6 164 
ZCU102 Kintex UltraScale+ (16nm) -2 2750 116 3354 6 302 
Table 3: Implementation results of proposed security policy engine (SPE) on Zedboard and ZCU102 
 
Table 2: Comparison of secure features supported by leading FPGA MPSoC 
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better silicon (speed grade), ZCU102 implementation 
achieved ≈ 1.84 times better timing than Zedboard. However, 
it comes at the cost of ≈ 2.63 and 2.33 times more LUT and 
FF utilisation required by the system infrastructure (AXI-
Interconnect, Reset processing system etc.) essential for Zynq 
UltraScale+ MPSoC.  
6 Conclusion and future work 
The paper has presented preliminary proof-of-concept work. 
The proposed policing approach will not only help to tackle 
security problems for future embedded devices, but also 
existing hardware architectures that did not consider security 
as a design requirement in their design flow. The integration 
of a software-defined and hardware-enforced security policy 
engine (SPE) brings adaptability to security platforms, where 
the same platform can be used to fulfil the diverse security 
requirements of different application domains and security 
levels. Additionally, the proposed system architecture 
compliments state-of-art chain-of-trust and authentication 
mechanisms, which mitigates against existing vulnerabilities 
and attacks and provides robust security measures to 
circumvent new vulnerabilities and attack vectors.  
The presented work will be continued to enable secure 
configuration of system hardware components and policing of 
more complex communication attributes.  From a software 
perspective, future work shall be targeted to provide isolation 
and segregation of hardware resources requested by software 
components, while being managed by the operating system.   
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